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The association between earnings quality and regulatory report opinions in the 
accounting industry – AICPA peer review and PCAOB inspections  
 
 
 
Abstract 
We compare the outcome of two different information systems – self regulation versus private 
sector regulation – in the accounting industry.  Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspections replaced American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) peer reviews of auditors.  Peer review opinions are 
useful with respect to decisions about hiring and firing of auditors (Hilary and Lennox, 2005); 
therefore, the question remains what are the benefits of incurring the cost to replace a self-
regulatory system with a private regulatory agency.  We examine the usefulness of these two 
information systems at distinguishing earnings quality at firms audited by the reviewed 
auditors. We find opinions from the PCAOB inspection are able to distinguish earnings 
quality (accounting discretion and earnings informativeness) whereas the peer review opinion 
does not.  Given that the PCAOB inspection report opinions are associated with earnings 
quality, we next identify characteristics associated with auditors that receive a positive 
PCAOB opinion.  We find they are larger (measured by the number of professional staff) and 
are more independent of clients.   
 
 
Keywords: PCAOB, Self-regulation, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Earnings Management, Earnings 
Quality 
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1.  Introduction 
In 2002, the U.S. Congress concluded that American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) peer review for public company auditors was ineffective in monitoring 
and policing the accounting industry.  As a consequence, the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB) was created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to oversee the accounting 
industry.  The switch from peer reviews to independent inspections allows us to test the merits 
of two very different information systems that review auditors.  Specifically, in this paper, we 
examine the effectiveness of these two information systems in distinguishing earnings quality 
at firms audited by the reviewed auditors.   
The creation of the PCAOB to oversee the regulation, registration and inspection of 
CPAs has been a major change in accounting industry: since 1988 the accounting industry has 
been self-regulated by peer review.  There are substantial differences between PCAOB 
inspections and peer reviews.  First, the PCAOB has greater powers of enforcement. It can 
conduct investigations, disciplinary proceedings, impose sanctions and it can refer 
deficiencies to regulatory agencies.  The second main difference is confidentiality.  The 
PCAOB may access all client documentation, interview clients’ audit committee members or 
directors.  By contrast, the peer review system is remedial and AICPA rules do not allow peer 
reviewers access to client documents expressly if clients prohibit their disclosure. 
There is evidence that suggests peer review opinions provide credible information 
about quality differences between auditors.  Hilary and Lennox (2005), using large-sample 
archival data, show that the opinion from the peer review system is a credible signal about the 
audit firm quality.  After receiving a clean opinion, an auditor would gain clients and after 
receiving an unclean opinion the auditor would lose clients.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
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small auditors can use a clean opinion to market their auditing services to potential clients 
(Frauenthal, 1991).   
Given that the peer review opinions are useful with respect to decisions about 
dismissal and hiring of auditors (Hilary and Lennox, 2005), the question remains what are the 
benefits of incurring the cost to replace a self-regulatory system with a private regulatory 
agency.  In this paper, we examine the effectiveness of both systems from the perspective of 
financial statement users, specifically, the ability to distinguish earnings quality among firms.  
The perspective of financial statement users is emphasized in the stated mission of the 
PCAOB: “to oversee the auditors of public companies in order to protect the interests of 
investors and further the public interest in the preparation of informative, fair and independent 
audit reports”. 
 We find that opinions from the PCAOB inspection are able to distinguish earnings 
quality whereas the peer review opinion does not.  Earnings quality is measured by the level 
of accounting discretion and earnings informativeness (the incremental association between 
earnings and future cash flows).  We measure accounting discretion in three ways: (1) the 
level of abnormal accruals (2) the frequency with which the firm just meets a quarterly 
earnings benchmark and (3) smoothing of earnings using accruals.  We find that accounting 
discretion is different for firms employing auditors that receive a positive versus negative 
opinion, under the PCAOB.    Specifically, firms using an auditor that receives a negative 
opinion use more accounting discretion to smooth earnings and meet quarterly benchmarks.  
In addition, we find earnings are more associated with future cash flows for firms employing 
an auditor that receives a positive opinion.  However, the evidence is inconsistent with the 
peer review system producing an opinion that distinguishes earnings quality.   
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 Given that we find opinions from the PCAOB inspection are able to distinguish 
earnings quality, we next identify characteristics associated with auditors that receive a 
positive opinion.  Prior literature focuses mainly on auditor size, particularly large auditors 
(Big 4) and small auditors (non-Big 4) to explain audit quality.  However, the literature does 
not provide direct evidence as to whether there are distinctions in quality within the 
dichotomy between large and small auditors.  We conduct a logit regression and find that 
auditors that receive a positive opinion from the PCAOB inspection process are larger, in 
terms of the number of professional staff, and audit more than one client.  Our findings 
provide evidence that even within the dichotomous size partition, the size of the auditor is 
positively associated with the earnings quality of the clients that they audit.      
 We make the following contributions. First, this paper contributes to the literature and 
debate on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was instituted to improve the 
quality of financial reporting (SEC, 2003c) and the PCAOB was created to “protect the 
interest of investors.”  Given the motives behind the creation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, we 
provide evidence that one benefit of switching from peer reviews to independent inspections 
is that audit reports from the PCAOB are able to distinguish earnings quality, whereas the 
peer review report was not. Specifically, we show that the PCAOB inspection process 
produces an opinion that is associated with accounting discretion distinctions as well as 
earnings informativeness distinctions (the incremental association between earnings and 
future cash flows) among firms; whereas the AICPA peer review report does not.  This 
provides evidence that the PCAOB provides incremental benefits over the peer review 
process.  However, the implication for standard setting is inconclusive because we did not 
examine directly the cost-benefit tradeoff.   
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 Second, we provide information about the usefulness of the self-regulated peer review 
system. Auditors with only private clients and in other countries continue to rely on self-
regulation, therefore understanding the association between the AICPA opinion and earnings 
quality is important. Third, the analysis contributes to the literature by shedding light on 
quality differentiation among non-Big 4 auditors. The accounting literature supports the 
notion that larger firms (the Big 4) are of higher quality.  However, we show that even within 
the dichotomous size partition (Big 4 versus non-Big 4) size matters. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background on 
regulation of the accounting profession and hypothesis development.  Section 3 describes the 
sample.  Section 4 provides descriptive statistics.  Section 5 provides the empirical analysis of 
earnings quality and the monitoring system and provides the empirical analysis of the 
characteristics of auditors that receive a positive opinion from the PCAOB inspection process.  
Section 6 concludes.   
2. Regulation of the accounting profession 
2.1 The PCAOB inspections process  
One of the main features of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was the creation of the PCAOB 
which was given responsibilities with respect to registration, inspection, and investigation of 
external auditors.  The PCAOB was established by a federal law and is overseen by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); however, the members of the PCAOB are not 
federal employees.  The stated purpose of the PCAOB is to “protect the interests of investors 
and further the public interest in the preparation of informative, fair and independent audit 
reports”.1   
                                                 
1PCAOB website: http://www.pcaob.org/News_and_Events/News/2004/10-26.aspx 
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Accounting firms (U.S.-based or foreign) that issue an audit report for an SEC-
reporting company or substantially participates in the audit must be registered with the 
PCAOB.  Registered public accounting firms that issue audit reports for more than 100 public 
companies are subject to annual inspections by the PCAOB, and those with 100 or less are 
subject to triennial inspections.  Also, the PCAOB has the authority to conduct unannounced 
inspections in special situations.  The inspectors are experienced auditors but do not currently 
have ties to the accounting industry.  According to several PCAOB reports the scope of the 
inspection procedure performed includes reviews of one to many (depending on the size of 
the auditor) of the financial statements of issuers.  The audits and aspects evaluated are 
selected according to the Board’s criteria, and the auditor is not allowed an opportunity to 
limit or influence the selection process.   
The PCAOB inspections mainly involve: (1) evaluating the quality of the audit work 
performed on a specific audit; (2) reviewing the auditor’s practices, policies and procedures 
related to audit quality (this review addresses practices, policies and procedures concerning 
audit performance, training, compliance with independence standards, client acceptance and 
retention, and the establishment of policies and procedures). Audit deficiency discovered 
related to (1) are disclosed in the PCAOB inspection report; however, defects related to (2) 
are discussed in the nonpublic portion of this report and will remain nonpublic unless the firm 
fails to address them to the Board's satisfaction within 12 months of the date of this report.  
Common types of deficiencies mentioned by the PCAOB inspectors include: failure to 
perform and document sufficient substantive procedures, failure to obtain and evaluate 
evidential matter, inappropriate reliance on the internal audit function or the work of another 
auditor and failure to apply applicable procedures used in planning and supervision of the 
audit.  Another category concerns the auditor’s ability to identify a GAAP departure within 
 6
the financial statements.  Some PCAOB inspection reports state that “the Firm's failure to 
identify, or to address appropriately, a departure from GAAP that related to a potentially 
material failure to disclose appropriately in the audited financial statements” concerning a 
specific accounting treatment.   
2.2 The difference between PCAOB inspections and peer reviews 
Under the AICPA peer review program, the firm could choose to be reviewed by one 
of the following: (1) another auditor (2) a private CPA association (3) a team appointed by the 
AICPA.  Of all the peer reviews from 1997 to 2003, 92% were conducted by another auditor, 
7% by a private association and 1% by an AICPA-appointed team.  Under the peer review 
program, auditors with SEC clients were monitored through mandatory reviews every three 
years.   The peer reviews mainly involved evaluating the quality control system along five 
dimensions: (1) independence, (2) personnel management, (3) client acceptance, (4) 
engagement performance and (5) monitoring (see AICPA, 1996).  The peer review produced 
four types of opinions: (1) clean, (2) unmodified with weaknesses, (3) modified, or (4) 
adverse.     
There are substantial differences between PCAOB inspections and peer reviews.  First, 
the PCAOB has greater powers of enforcement.  It can conduct investigations, conduct 
disciplinary proceedings and impose sanctions (like prohibiting firms from auditing publicly 
traded companies).  In addition, the PCAOB can communicate inspection results to regulatory 
and law enforcement agencies. In contrast, the focus of peer reviews, from its inception, was 
remedial and corrective rather than punitive.  The second main difference is confidentiality.  
Under AICPA rules, peer reviewers had no access to clients’ documents that clients expressly 
forbade their auditors to disclose.  However, the PCAOB may access all client documentation 
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(even when the clients’ documents expressly prohibit their auditors from disclosing them) and 
interview clients’ audit committee members or directors.   
3. Hypothesis Development 
It is not obvious whether the PCAOB inspection process will produce an opinion that 
is more associated with earnings quality than the peer review system.  On the one hand, the 
PCAOB has unprecedented powers of enforcement and access to confidential documents and 
clients.  Since the scope of the PCAOB inspection process is broadened by these powers and 
access, we would expect the opinion from the audit report to be more associated to earnings 
quality.  In contrast, under AICPA rules, peer reviewers had no access to clients’ documents 
that clients expressly prohibited their auditors from disclosing. 
 On the other hand, we may expect PCAOB opinions to be equally, or less, effective at 
distinguishing earnings quality than peer review opinions.  The only public portion of the 
PCAOB inspection report is with respect to the evaluation of a specific audit engagement.  
Deficiencies discovered in the review of the firm’s practices, policies and procedures are only 
publicly disclosed if they are not fixed within 12 months.  In contrast, the complete peer 
review opinions were made publicly available by the AICPA as soon as reviews were 
complete.  Therefore, the public portion of the PCAOB report may only contain a subset of 
the information required to assess earnings quality.  In addition, similar to the peer review 
system, the PCAOB inspection process is performed using a risk-based approach.  The report 
does not provide assurance with respect to every engagement conducted by the accounting 
firm because not every aspect of the engagement is reviewed (only key areas).  Therefore, it is 
possible that the inspection may not find all deficiencies in a specific engagement.   
 Furthermore, PCAOB inspection may lack the ability to discriminate between 
differing qualities.  Daniel L. Goelzer, PCAOB board member, noted some challenges to 
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“running an efficient and effective inspections program” in a speech at the annual conference 
of a Canadian accounting firm.2  First, committing enough qualified resources to inspect all 
the registered firms in a timely manner will be challenging given the large number of 
registered firms.  Goelzerm acknowledges “Just meeting the statutory three-year inspection 
cycle requirement will be a major accomplishment, given the number of registered firms. Last 
year, we inspected 99 firms, and this year, we will inspect over 250, including several 
Canadian firms.”  Second, the diversity among registered firms complicates the inspection 
process.  He explains “We need to make sure that our inspection program recognizes the 
differences between firms and fosters the widest possible range of auditor choice for public 
companies without compromising the protection of the public.”   
We examine the earnings quality of firms employing auditors that receive a positive 
and negative audit report from review process.  Specifically, we test whether the opinions 
produced by the two different information systems are correlated with earnings quality 
(accounting discretion and earnings informativeness).  We test the following two null 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Accounting discretion is higher for firms employing an auditor that 
receives a negative opinion from either regulatory process than by an auditor that receives a 
positive opinion.   
 Hypothesis 2: The association between earnings and future cash flows (earnings 
informativeness) is higher for firms employing an auditor that receives a positive opinion 
from either regulatory process than by an auditor that receives a negative opinion.   
 Since we find opinions from the PCAOB inspection are able to distinguish earnings 
quality, we next identify characteristics associated with auditors that receive a positive 
                                                 
2Goelzer, D. (2005) “Meeting the challenges of the changing global regulatory environment” Sept. 29, 2005 
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opinion.  The bulk of the literature uses Big 4 and non-Big 4 as a basis for distinguishing 
audit quality.  The next level of research examines potential audit quality differentiation 
among Big 4 auditors along several variables: industry specialization, individual practice 
offices and across countries.  However, the literature does not focus on the potential audit 
quality differentiation among non-Big 4 auditors.  We address the question: what are the 
characteristics of small auditors that are associated with positive PCAOB opinions?   
First, we focus on size and examine whether the size of the auditor (measured as 
number of staff) is a determinant of receiving a positive opinion from the PCAOB inspection 
process.  The argument for size being positively related to high quality auditing is that the 
larger the accounting firm the more established the brand name and therefore greater the 
incentive to protect their reputation by providing a high quality audit (Simunic and Stein, 
1987).  Second, using the ratio of the number of audit partners to the number of professional 
staff employed by the auditors as a measure of expertise, we argue that the probability the 
firm receives a positive opinion from the PCAOB inspection process is positively associated 
with expertise.     
Third, we examine the association between the probability of receiving a positive 
opinion and characteristics used in prior literature to proxy for auditor independence: single 
client and tenure.  DeAngelo (1981) argues that one client is not important to a large auditor 
therefore they are less likely to acquiesce to a single client because they have their reputation 
to protect.  However, for auditors with a single client, they may have more to gain by 
acquiescing to client demands than by being tough and potentially losing their sole income 
stream.  The accounting literature suggests that an auditor may become captive to a client in 
long tenure situations which is the argument for mandatory auditor rotation.  However, the 
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evidence is mixed as to whether auditor tenure is associated with the quality of the audit.3   It 
may be the case that the longer the audit tenure the more knowledgeable the auditor is about 
that particular firm and the more likely the auditor is to discover a deficiency.  We test the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: An auditor that receives a positive opinion from the PCAOB inspection 
process is larger, has more expertise and is more independent of clients.  
4. Sample selection and description 
 We obtain all inspection reports from the PCAOB website from 1/21/05 to 7/13/2006.4  
From each report we obtain the following data: auditor name, dates when the field work was 
conducted, date the inspection report was publicly disclosed, number of offices, location(s) of 
the auditor, ownership structure, number of partners, number of professional staff, whether 
there was an audit deficiency and whether one of the audit deficiencies related to a failure to 
identify a departure from GAAP (“firm's failure to identify, or to address appropriately, 
departures from GAAP that related to potentially material misstatements in the audited 
financial statements”).  We obtain data on 294 auditors. Next, we match each auditor to the 
auditor key in the Audit Analytics database.  We find a matching auditor key for 268 of the 
auditors with a PCAOB inspection report.  After matching the auditor to clients using Audit 
Analytics and then matching those clients to Compustat data, we have 5,795 auditor-client 
observations and 178 auditors.   
 We obtain the peer review data used in Hilary and Lennox (2005).5  The database 
contains information on each firm’s most recent peer review opinion and the reviewed firm’s 
                                                 
3See Meyers et al. (2003) and Johnson et al. (2002) 
4http://www.pcaobus.org/Inspections/Public_Reports/index.aspx 
5We are grateful to Hilary and Lennox for providing the data. 
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characteristics from the annual report closest to the opinion date.  There are 1,001 peer 
reviewed audit reports from 6/27/1997 – 9/11/2003.  The Audit Analytics database starts in 
2000; therefore we were able to find a matching auditor key for 672 of the auditors.  After 
matching the auditor to its clients using Audit Analytics and then matching those clients to 
Compustat data, we have 5,685 auditor-client observations and 328 auditors.    Of the 178 
auditors in the PCAOB sample, 114 receive a report that indicates one or more audit 
deficiencies and 64 receive a report that indicates no audit deficiencies from the PCAOB 
inspection process.6  Of the 328 auditors, 137 receive a clean opinion and 191 receive an 
unmodified, modified or adverse opinion from the peer review process.   
 Table 1, Panel A provides descriptive statistics of the accounting firms’ clients by 
information system.  Of the auditors in the PCAOB sample, the mean (median) number of 
professional staff members per audit firm is 507 (14) people.  The mean (median) number of 
publicly traded clients is 33 (2.00).  Both the number of clients and professional staff is 
skewed because the Big 4 auditors may have many professionals/clients whereas the small 
firms have only a few.  Of the auditors in the peer review sample, the mean (median) number 
of professional staff members per auditor is 104 (37) people.  The mean (median) number of 
publicly traded clients is 17 (1.00).   
Table 1, Panel B reports industry composition for each information system.  There are 
48 industries based on the classification system developed by Fama and French, (1997).  The 
most highly represented industries for both the PCAOB and peer review is banking and 
business services.  In the subsequent analysis, we conduct sensitivity analysis excluding firms 
                                                 
6We examine auditor changes for both the PCAOB and peer review sample and find 13 and 21 changes 
respectively.  We no not include these clients in our sample.  As a sensitivity test we include these observations 
in the sample (both matching to the original auditor and the auditor that the client switched to) and the results are 
unchanged.   
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in the financial and utility industry because they operate in highly regulated industries with 
accounting rules that differ from those in other industries.   
5.  Earnings Quality Measures 
 To provide evidence on hypothesis 1, we examine three measures of accounting 
discretion: (1) the use of discretionary accruals; (2) the propensity to meet benchmarks; and 
(3) the use of earnings smoothing techniques.  We compare these measures between firms for 
which the information system produced a positive and negative opinion.  If the audit report 
opinions (from either system) are able to identify accounting discretion among firms 
employed by reviewed auditors, we would expect firms with an auditor that has a negative 
opinion to exhibit more accounting discretion.   
5.1 Discretionary accruals 
We use the modified Jones model to estimate three variations of abnormal accruals.  The 
estimation is as follows:   
Variables: 
TAj,t = (ΔCAj,t − ΔCLj,t − ΔCASHj,t + ΔSTDEBTj,t − DEPNj,t)  
TCAj,t = (ΔCAj,t − ΔCLj,t − ΔCASHj,t + ΔSTDEBTj,t)  
CFOj,t = NIBEj,t − TAj,t  
where:  
TAj,t = firm j’s total accruals in year t,  
TCAj,t = firm j’s total current accruals in year t,  
CFOj,t = firm j’s cash flow from operations in year t,  
ΔCAj,t = firm j’s change in current assets (Compustat #4) from year t-1 to year t,  
ΔCLj,t = firm j’s change in current liabilities (Compustat #5) from year t-1 to year t,  
ΔCASHj,t = firm j’s change in cash (Compustat #1) from year t-1 to year t,  
ΔSTDEBTj,t = firm j’s change in short-term debt (Compustat #34) from year t-1 to year t,  
DEPNj,t = firm j’s depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat #14) in year t,  
NIBEj,t = firm j’s net income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18) in year t.  
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To estimate abnormal total accruals and abnormal total current accruals, we perform 
the following cross-sectional regressions for each of Fama and French’s (1997) 48 industry 
groups containing at least 20 firms in each year:7  
TAj,t /Aj,t-1 =  k1,t*1/Aj,t-1 + k2,t*ΔREVj,t /Aj,t-1+ k2,t*PPEj,t /Aj,t-1 + ε j,t    (1) 
TCAj,t /Aj,t-1 =  γ1,t*1/Aj,t-1 + γ2,t*ΔREVj,t /Aj,t-1 + υj,t      (2) 
Next, we use the industry-year specific parameter estimates from (1) and (2) to 
estimate firm-specific normal accruals and normal current accruals (as a percent of lagged 
total assets): 
NAj,t =  est(k1,t)*1/Aj,t-1 + est(k2,t)*(ΔREVj,t – ΔARj,t) /Aj,t-1+ est(k3,t)*PPEj,t /Aj,t-1 + υj,t  (3) 
NCAj,t =  est(γ1,t)*1/Aj,t-1 + est(γ2,t)ΔREVj,t /Aj,t-1 + υj,t     (4) 
ΔREVj,t = firm j’s change in revenues (Compustat #12) in year t,  
PPEj,t = firm j’s gross value of property, plant and equipment (Compustat #7) in year 
t, and we have deflated by firm j’s total assets in year t-1 (Assetsj, t-1, Compustat #6).  
EQ1 is the value of abnormal accruals (Jones, 1991 as modified by Dechow et al. , 
1995): ,
1,
,
, j
tj
tj
tj NAAsset
TA
AA −=
−
.  EQ2 is the value of abnormal current accruals (Teoh et al., 
1998): tj
tj
tj
tj NCAAsset
TCA
ACA ,
1,
,
, −=
−
.  EQ3 is the value of abnormal accruals (similar to EQ1), 
with ROA added as an additional control variable, because previous research finds that the 
Jones model is misspecified for well-performing or poorly performing firms (Kothari et al. 
2005).   
5.2 Propensity to meet benchmarks 
                                                 
7We winsorize the extreme values of the distribution to the 1 and 99 percentile. 
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 Prior research indicates that there is pressure on firms to meet or beat various earnings 
benchmarks: zero earnings and positive earnings changes (Hayn, 1995; Barth et al., 1999; 
Brown, 2001).  Researchers find a disproportionate number of firms that meet or slightly beat 
these benchmarks than would be expected by chance (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; 
Degeorge et al., 1999; Jacob and Jorgensen, 2006).  We focus on two benchmarks: zero 
quarterly earnings and positive quarterly earnings changes.  The use of benchmarks by 
managers is supported by Graham et al. (2005), who survey 401 financial executives about 
key factors that drive decisions about reported earnings and voluntary disclosure.  They report 
that Chief Financial Officers consider seasonally lagged quarterly earnings as an important 
benchmark.8   
We categorize a firm as having a small earnings profit when quarterly earnings 
(Compustat #23 - #32) scaled by total assets (Compustat #44) at the end of quarter q-1 falls 
within the range of (0.00 to 0.0025).  We categorize a firm as having a small positive change 
in earnings when the change in quarterly earnings (Eq – Eq-4) scaled by total assets at the end 
of quarter q-5 falls within the range of (0.00 to 0.0025).  Earnings are measured as earnings 
after tax and special items.9   
 Our measure of accounting discretion, with respect to meeting benchmarks, is an 
annual variable.  Therefore, we measure the frequency with which firms just meets zero 
quarterly earnings (FREQ_Zero) as the sum of the small quarterly earnings profits over the 
year.  The maximum for this variable is four (when the firm has a small quarterly earnings 
profit in all four quarters) and the minimum is zero (when the firm does not have a small 
quarterly earnings profit in any quarter).  Similarly, we measure the frequency with which a 
                                                 
8 We do not use analyst forecasts as a benchmark because analyst coverage increases with firm size and 
requiring analyst forecasts would severely restrict the sample. 
9We re-ran the analysis using net income and pre-tax income and the results are qualitatively similar. 
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firm just meets seasonally lagged quarterly earnings (FREQ_ZeroChng) as the sum of the 
small positive change in earnings over the year.  This variable has a maximum of four and a 
minimum of zero.          
5.3 Earnings smoothing measures 
Earnings smoothing reduces the variability of reported earnings by altering the accrual 
component of earnings.  Smoothing indicate that, ceteris paribus, managers exercise 
accounting discretion to reduce the variance of reported earnings.  We use two proxies for 
earnings smoothing.10  We estimate an annual earnings smoothing variable (SmoothA5) as the 
standard deviation of annual cash flows adjusted for extraordinary items (Compustat #308 – 
Compustat #124) divided by the standard deviation of earnings (Compustat #123) over the 
current and past 4 annual periods.  We estimate a quarterly earnings smoothing variable 
(SmoothQ8) as the standard deviation of quarterly cash flows adjusted for extraordinary items 
(Compustat #108 – Compustat #78) divided by the standard deviation of earnings (Compustat 
#76) over the current and past 7 quarters.  High values of both smoothing variables indicate 
that, ceteris paribus, managers exercise more accounting discretion to smooth reported 
earnings.        
5.4 Accounting discretion variables – descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports the accounting discretion variables by information system.  The top 
portion of the table reports the results for the PCAOB sample.  Of the 5,795 auditor-client 
observations in the PCAOB sample, we are able to estimate the discretionary accruals model 
for 3,751 auditor-client observations.  The mean and median for all three discretionary 
accruals models are close to zero and not statistically different from zero.  We have data 
available to calculate the frequency with which the firm just meets quarterly earnings 
                                                 
10See Leuz et al. 2002 and Pincus and Rajgopal 2002  
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benchmark for 4,504 auditor-client observations.  The mean frequency for which a firm just 
meets zero quarterly earnings (zero change in quarterly earnings) is 12% (30%) of the time.  
The median is zero for both benchmarks, indicating that just meeting these benchmarks is 
rare.  For the smoothing variables, we are able to estimate the annual (quarterly) smoothing 
variable for 4,382 (4,047) auditor-client observations.  The mean for SmoothA5 is 1.58 
indicating that standard deviation of annual cash flows is higher than the standard deviation of 
annual earnings, however the median is less than one.   
The bottom portion of table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the accounting 
discretion variables for the peer review sample.  Of the 5,685 auditor-client observations, we 
are able to calculate abnormal accruals measures for 3,601 auditor-client observations.  
Similar to the PCAOB inspection sample, all three discretionary accruals variables are around 
zero and the mean and median is not statistically different from zero.  The mean frequency for 
which a firm just meets zero quarterly earnings (zero change in quarterly earnings) is 14% 
(23%) of the time.  The median is zero for both benchmarks.  For the smoothing variables, we 
are able to estimate the annual (quarterly) smoothing variable for 4,305 (4,404) auditor-client 
observations.  The mean (median) for SmoothA5 is 1.65 indicating that standard deviation of 
annual cash flows is higher than the standard deviation of annual earnings, however the 
median is less than one.  The mean and median for Smooth Q8 are both greater than zero.  
6. Earnings quality and the information system 
6.1 Accounting discretion and the information system – results 
Table 3 reports the inspection report opinions by information system for both the non-
Big 4 and Big 4 auditors.  After the PCAOB staff finishes collecting evidence, the PCAOB 
inspectors issue a report.  The report indicates whether or not the firm has any audit 
deficiencies, the number of deficiencies and a description of the deficiency.  Using the 
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information in the PCAOB inspection reports, we identify auditors receiving a “positive” 
opinion from the PCAOB inspectors in two ways: (1) if the PCAOB inspection report does 
not reveal any audit deficiencies; (2) if the PCAOB inspection report does not reveal that the 
accounting firm failed to identify or appropriately address a GAAP departure.  Table 3, Panel 
A shows that out of the 174 non-Big 4 auditors with an inspection report, 64 (37%) received a 
report indicating no audit deficiency while 110 received one or more audit deficiencies.  Of 
the firms that received one or more audit deficiencies, the average number of deficiencies is 
3.5.  The number of deficiencies for the 30 firms that received a report indicating the firm 
failed to identify a GAAP departure is 6.53.  This confirms that GAAP deficiency firms (17% 
of the sample) may indicate a more serious problem because this category has the highest 
number of deficiencies.  The last column of table 3 shows that all four Big 4 auditors receive 
at least one deficiency and 2 receive a failure to identify a departure from GAAP.   
The scope and structure of peer reviews and PCAOB inspection are different.  For 
example, PCAOB inspectors have more power of enforcement and have greater access to 
documents and clients (see section 2.1).  The peer review report issues one of four opinions 
(clean, unmodified, modified or adverse) and indicates the number of weakness.  The peer 
review does not include a specific description of the weakness.  A clean opinion was issued if 
the reviewers found no significant weakness.  If a weakness was significant but not serious, an 
unmodified opinion was issued.  In cases where the weakness was serious, a modified opinion 
was issued and when a weakness was very serious, an adverse opinion was issued.   
Using the information in the peer review report, we identify auditors receiving a 
“positive” opinion from the peer review process in two ways: (1) if the peer review indicates a 
clean opinion; (2) if the peer review report indicates a clean or unmodified opinion but not a 
modified or adverse opinion.  Clearly, there are some issues with the accounting firm if they 
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receive an unmodified opinion, however the deficiency could be considered “significant but 
not serious.”  Table 3, Panel B shows that out of the 324 non-Big 4 auditors with an peer 
review report, 137 (42%) receive a clean opinion and 178 (55%) receive an unmodified 
opinion.  Modified and adverse opinions are very rare and make up only 3% of the sample.  
The average number of weaknesses is 1.9 for unmodified reports; however the number is 
larger for modified and adverse opinions (2.4 and 6.0, respectively).  This indicates that 
modified and adverse opinions may indicate a more serious problem because this category has 
the highest number of weaknesses.  The last column of table 3 shows that all four Big 4 
auditors receive an unmodified opinion.   
Both Table 4 and Table 5 reports the results comparing accounting discretion variables 
between the firms employing auditors that receive a positive and negative opinion from the 
PCAOB inspection and peer review report, respectively.  In this section we average 
accounting discretion across the auditor’s portfolio of clients; so each auditor enters the 
analysis once.11  Therefore, this analysis is not susceptible to the concern that the Big 4 will 
overweight the analysis in one direction because every auditor enters the analysis with a 
single observation.  Panel A reports the results comparing average client accounting discretion 
for auditors that received one or more audit deficiencies versus no audit deficiency. 
Accounting discretion is higher for firms audited by auditors with one or more audit 
deficiencies.  The discretionary accruals and smoothing variables are not statistically different 
                                                 
11If we did not average across the auditor’s portfolio of clients, a Big 4 accounting firm would enter the sample 
with several hundred clients whereas the average non- Big 4 firm would enter the sample with 6.8 clients: 
instead of testing the association between the opinion and earnings quality, we would be testing the difference in 
earnings quality between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors. For both information systems, all four Big 4 auditors 
receive a negative opinion:  all Big 4 auditors receive an unmodified opinion with weakness for the peer reviews; 
all Big 4 auditors' receive several deficiencies and two receive a failure to identify a GAAP departure for the 
PCAOB inspections.   
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between the two samples.  However, the frequency of time the firm reports a small quarterly 
earnings profit or small positive quarterly earnings change is significantly higher.   
Table 4, Panel B, reports the univariate results comparing the accounting discretion 
variables between firms audited by auditors that failed to identify a departure from GAAP and 
those that did not.  The discretionary accruals measures provide some evidence that those 
firms employing auditors that receive a positive opinion use less discretionary accruals to 
manage earnings upward.  Although the mean difference for EQ1 and EQ2 is significantly 
higher for firms with auditors that failed to identify a departure from GAAP, the median 
difference is not significant.  The evidence on the other accounting discretion variables, the 
frequency of times the firm just meets a benchmark and the level of earnings smoothing, is 
higher and significantly different in some cases.  High values of benchmark variables indicate 
managers use discretion more often to achieve earnings benchmarks.  High values of 
smoothing variables indicate that insiders exercise more accounting discretion to smooth 
reported earnings.  Overall, the evidence suggests that firms employing an auditor that 
receives a negative opinion from the PCAOB inspection process exhibits more accounting 
discretion than a firm employing an auditor that receives a positive opinion.   
Table 5 reports the results comparing the accounting discretion variables between 
firms that received a positive and negative opinion from the peer review report.  None of the 
accounting discretion variables are significantly different for firms that employ an auditor that 
receives a negative versus a positive opinion.  Overall, there is no evidence to suggest that 
firms employing an auditor that receives a negative opinion from the PCAOB inspection 
process exhibits more accounting discretion than a firm employing an auditor that receives a 
positive opinion.   
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Table 6 and Table 7 use non-averaged data so that the auditor enters the sample for 
every client-auditor observation.  We omit the Big 4 auditor in this analysis to alleviate 
concerns that they will overweight the analysis in one direction.  Table 6 reports accounting 
discretion variables are larger for the firms that employ an auditor that receives a negative 
versus a positive opinion.  The annual smoothing variable is not significantly different; 
however, the quarterly smoothing variable is significantly higher for firms employing an 
auditor with one or more audit deficiencies.  The results are similar to Table 4 – auditors that 
receive a negative opinion appear to allow more accounting discretion in their clients than 
others.   
Table 7 confirms our findings in Table 5.  The only evidence to suggest that the peer 
review report distinguishes earnings quality is for the frequency of times the firm reports a 
zero change in earnings.  The frequency is higher in the non-clean audited firms than in the 
firms audited by a clean auditor.  All of the other accounting discretionary variables are not 
significantly different.  Similarly, when we define audit quality in terms of whether or not 
peer review discovered a serious weakness (i.e. modified or adverse opinion) there appears to 
be no evidence that accounting discretion is different for these two samples.  The only 
indication is for the mean difference in the quarterly smoothing variable; all other accounting 
discretion variables are not significantly different.  Overall, we find opinions from the 
PCAOB inspection are able to identify auditors that allow accounting discretion whereas the 
peer review opinion does not.12 13     
                                                 
12We conduct sensitivity analysis excluding firms in the financial and utility industry because they operate in 
highly regulated industries with accounting rules that differ from those in other industries.  The inferences do not 
change. 
13 We conduct sensitivity analysis that controls for industry, size and performance.  We match each firm 
employing an auditor that receives a negative opinion to a firm that receives a negative opinion matched by two-
digit SIC, total assets within 20% and performance within 20%.  The matching requirement and the limited 
number of clean opinion firms limit the sample size.  However, the results are qualitatively similar.   
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6.2 Earnings informativeness – results 
 The stated object of financial reporting, according to the FASB’s conceptual 
framework (Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts 1), is to provide investors with 
information to assess the timing and uncertainty of future cash flows.   Based on the FASB 
statement which purports “financial reporting should provide information to help investors, 
creditors, and others assess the amounts, timing, and uncertainty of prospective net cash 
inflows to the related enterprise,” we assume that earnings that are more highly associated 
with future cash flows are more informative (Dechow et al 1998; Barth et al 2001).  We 
estimate the following regression to test whether firms employing auditors that receive a 
negative opinion, as identified by both the PCAOB inspection and AICPA peer review 
process, have less informative earnings (in terms of the incremental association between 
earnings and future cash flows): 
CFOt+1 = γ0 + γ1NEGATIVEt + γ2EARNt + γ3NEGATIVE*EARNt + γ4#Segmentst + 
γ5Foreign_Incomet + γ6M&At + γ7Restructuringt + ε  (7) 
CFO = Cash flow from operating activities (Compustat #308) deflated by total assets 
(Compustat #6) 
NEGATIVE =  An indicator variable that is set equal to one if the firm’s auditor 
receives a negative opinion from the review process 
EARN =  Earnings (Compustat #172) deflated by total assets (Data #6)  
#Segments = Number of reported business segments in year t (Compustat Segment 
File) 
Foreign_Income = an indicator variable that is set equal to one if a firm reports foreign 
income in 2003, and zero otherwise (Compustat Segment File) 
M&A = an indicator variable that is set equal to one if a firm is involved in a merger 
or acquisition, and zero otherwise (AFTNT#1) 
Restructuring = an indicator variable that is set equal to one of a firm was involved in  
a restructuring in year t, and zero otherwise (Data376-Data379) 
 
 If earnings informativeness is less for firms employing an auditor that receives a 
negative opinion, then we would expect the coefficient on NEGATIVE*EARN to be less than 
zero.  We have four control variables that proxy for the complexity of the audit function at a 
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particular firm (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006).  We use #Segments and Foreign_Income to 
proxy for complexity and scope of a firms operation which could lead to lower earnings 
quality even if the firm employed a high quality auditor.  We use M&A and Restructuring to 
proxy for recently changed organization structure which could lead to lower earnings quality 
because of challenges integrating cultures, operations and accounting systems.   
Table 8 reports the results of a regression of future cash flows on current earnings for 
the PCAOB sample.  The first column of the table presents the results using one or more audit 
deficiencies as the criteria for a negative audit report opinion.  We find a positive coefficient 
on EARN indicating a positive association between current earnings and one period ahead 
cash flows.  We find a statistically significant negative coefficient on NEGATIVE*EARN (-
.009).  This indicates that earnings informativeness is lower for firms that receive a negative 
report from the PCAOB inspection process.  The second column of the table presents the 
results using the auditor failed to identify a departure from GAAP as the criteria for a negative 
audit report opinion.  Once again, we find an incrementally negative association between 
earnings and one-period-ahead cash flows (-.058).  For these firms, the relationship between 
current earnings and future cash flows is less positive than for the others.  Therefore, earnings 
are less informative, in terms of forecasting cash flows, for firms employing an auditor that 
receives a negative opinion from the PCAOB inspection process.  The last two columns report 
the results for the full sample (Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors) and the results are similar.  We 
find an incrementally negative association between earnings and one-period-ahead cash flows 
when we include the Big 4.  The coefficient on NEGATIVE*EARN is not significant for the 
full sample when using any audit deficiency as a negative opinion. This insignificant result 
may be due to the fact that negative sample is overweighed by clients of Big 4 auditors since 
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all Big 4 auditor received negative opinions. Previous research provides evidence that Big 4 
auditors provide high quality audits than Non Big 4       
 Table 9 reports the results of a regression of future cash flows on current earnings for 
the peer review sample.  Since the peer review report sample spans 2000 to 2003, the t-
statistics use clustered standard errors which are robust to within year correlation.14  The first 
column of the table presents the results using unmodified, modified or adverse as the criteria 
for a negative audit report opinion.  We find a statistically significant positive coefficient on 
NEGATIVE*EARN.  This indicates that there is a more positive association between 
earnings and one-period-ahead cash flows for firms that receive a negative opinion from the 
peer review process than for others.  The second column of the table presents the results using 
a more stringent criterion for a negative opinion, a modified or adverse opinion.  Once again, 
we find a positive incremental association between earnings and one-period-ahead cash flows 
for firms receiving a negative opinion.   The last two columns report the results for the full 
sample (Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors) and the results are similar.  We find an incrementally 
positive association between earnings and one-period-ahead cash flows when we include the 
Big 4 using modified or adverse as a negative opinion but not when using unmodified, 
modified or adverse as the negative opinion.  This could be subject to the same Big 4 biases 
mentioned above because all Big 4 receive an unmodified opinion.   
 Overall, these results demonstrate that the signal from the PCAOB inspection report is 
more effective at distinguishing earnings informativeness in firms audited by the reviewed 
auditors than the peer review process.  A negative opinion, from the PCAOB process, predicts 
a weaker incremental association between earnings and future cash flows.  A negative 
                                                 
14We do not use clustered standard errors which are robust to within year correlation for the PCAOB sample 
because the sample only includes observations from 2005.  The 2006 observations lack one-period-ahead cash 
flows to use in the regression. 
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opinion, from the peer review process, surprisingly predicts a stronger incremental association 
between earnings and future cash flows.    This result holds regardless of whether we include 
or exclude the Big 4 auditors.   
 There are two alternative explanations for the unexpected results regarding the earning 
informativeness distinction of peer review opinions.  First, it may be that the remedial nature 
of the peer review process helps the auditor to improve their auditing function and therefore 
results in earnings that better represent the underlying economics of the firm (i.e. less 
accounting discretion and/or more earnings informativeness) for the auditors flagged to have 
problems.  If this were true, then we would expect the peer review opinion to identify quality 
distinctions in the year prior to issuing the report but not the year of the report.  To evaluate 
the merits of the remedial explanation, we examine lagged earnings quality.  We find no 
difference in accounting discretion or earnings informativeness in the year prior to issuing the 
audit opinion.  These results provide evidence against the remedial explanation.   
 Second, the output of the peer review process doesn’t necessarily reflect earnings 
informativeness because peer review focuses on quality controls at the audit firm. It may be 
the case the auditor doesn’t have the proper quality controls; however, the auditor is still able 
to affect accounting treatments that influence earnings informativeness. Alternatively, an 
auditor without proper quality control system may be less willing to accept risky firms (those 
with more volatility in earnings). This may contribute to the surprising relationship we find 
between peer review opinions and earnings informativeness. In any case, peer review process 
fails to produce positive opinions for high quality audit firms.  Assuming one of the goals for 
the two regulatory systems in the accounting industry is to provide useful information 
associated with earnings quality, it appears that the PCAOB inspection process is more 
effective than AICPA peer reviews.   
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6.3 Discussion of potential confounding events  
 Many could argue that earnings quality changed over our sample period, specifically 
due to the implementation of provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.  However, given 
our methodology, we believe a change in earnings quality over time is not likely to influence 
our results.  The effect of an earnings quality change over our sample period on our results 
depends on three scenarios for how earnings quality has improved since 2000: 1.) equal 
improvement across all firms 2.) greater improvement for firms employing an auditor that 
receives a negative opinion or 3) greater improvement for firms employing an auditor that 
receives a positive opinion.   
We believe that scenario 1 and 2 would not affect our results.  For scenario 1, given 
our methodology that compares earnings quality between clients of auditors that receive 
positive and negative opinions, this would only add a constant amount of earnings quality 
improvement to our PCAOB sample.  As far as the test of the difference between positive and 
negative samples, our ability to detect a difference would be the same because a constant 
amount is added to both samples.  For scenario 2, an earnings quality improvement in firms 
employing a negative auditor over time would bias against our finding a difference in the 
PCAOB sample.  Basically earnings quality for the negative opinion sample would improve 
(i.e. get closer to the earnings quality of the positive opinion sample) and make differences 
over time harder to detect.   
If scenario 3 is true, this may explain our results because it biases towards our finding.  
However, in practice we find this the least likely of the scenarios.  We do not believe that the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act targeted high earnings quality firms; conversely it was intended to curb 
fraud.  For example, , Section 404, mandating a internal control report, would likely improve 
earnings quality more for bad firms than for good firms.   
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7. The characteristics of auditors that receive a positive opinion from the PCAOB 
inspection process 
 Given the private regulation system produces an opinion that is associated with 
earnings quality differences among firms audited by reviewed firms, we next identify 
characteristics associated with auditors that receive a positive opinion.  We estimate the 
following logit regression to examine the characteristics of firms that receive a positive 
opinion from the PCAOB process: 
POSITIVEt = γ0 + γ1logNumStafft + γ2logNumClientt + γ3OneClientt + γ4AvgTenuret + 
γ5Partner/Prof + γ6Big5 + εt    
 POSITIVE = an indicator variable equal to one if the auditors is free of  
 deficiecies and zero otherwise per the PCAOB inspection report  
 logNumStaff = the natural logarithm of the total number of partners and  professional 
 staff employed by the auditor at the in year t  
 logNumClient  = the natural logarithm of the total number of clients serviced by the  
 auditor in year t 
OneClient = an indicator variable equal to one if the auditor only has one client in 
year t and zero otherwise  
AvgTenure = the average tenure (number of consecutive years the auditor worked 
for a specific client) of an auditor's portfolio of clients scaled to be a variable between 
0 and 1 
 Partner/Prof = ratio of the number of audit partners divided by the number of  
 professional staff employed by the auditor in year t scaled to be a variable  between 0 
 and 1  
 
 The model includes variables that proxy for size, auditor independence and expertise.  
We winsorize the sample at 1% and 99% to reduce the impact of outliers.  The size variable 
logNumStaff  is the natural logarithm of the total number of partners and professional staff 
employed at the auditor.  We expect size to be positively related to an auditor receiving a 
positive opinion because the larger the accounting firm the more established the brand name 
and therefore greater the incentive to protect their reputation (Simunic and Stein, 1987).   We 
use logNumClient (the natural logarithm of the total number of clients serviced by the 
auditor) to control for the fact that the more clients an auditor has, the more audit 
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engagements that get inspected by the PCAOB due to the risk-based approach.  The larger 
firms (measured by number of clients) are more likely to have a deficiency because the 
PCAOB reviews more audit engagements.  Therefore, we expect the sign to be negatively 
related to receiving a positive opinion.   
 Next, we examine the association between the probability of receiving a positive 
opinion and whether the firm has a single client and tenure of the current auditor.  An 
accounting firm with a single client is more likely to acquiesce to client demands for fear of 
losing their only client.  We predict a negative sign on the variable OneClient.  The 
accounting literature suggests that an auditor may become captive to clients in long tenure 
situations and supports for mandatory auditor rotation.  However, the evidence is mixed as to 
whether auditor tenure is associated with audit quality.15  Partner/Prof is the number of audit 
partners to the number of professional staff employed by the auditor.  This is used as a 
measure of expertise and we argue that this ratio will be positively related to the auditor 
receiving a positive opinion from the review process.   
 Table 10, reports the results of the regression of a positive PCAOB opinion on the 
characteristics of the auditor for the non-Big 4 sample.  In the third column, we define a 
positive opinion if the firm receives no indication of an audit deficiency.  In the fourth 
column, we define a positive opinion if the firm receives no failure to identify a GAAP 
deficiency.  Defining a positive opinion as receiving no audit deficiencies, the coefficient on 
size (logNumStaff) is significant and in the predicted direction.  The coefficient on 
logNumClient is significant and in the predicted direction.  It appears the more engagements 
the PCAOB inspects the more likely they are to find a deficiency.  Controlling for the number 
of clients inspected, the larger the firm in terms of staff members, the more likely the firm is 
                                                 
15Francis (2004); Meyers et al. (2003); Johnson et al. (2002) 
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to receive a positive audit opinion.  This result provides evidence that even within the Big 4 
non-Big 4 dichotomy, size matters with respect to receiving a positive opinion from the 
PCAOB inspection report.  Until now, the accounting literature hasn’t provided evidence as to 
whether there are distinctions in quality within the dichotomy between large and small 
auditors.  
 Of the proxies for auditor independence, having a single client decreases the 
probability the firm receives a positive opinion.  It appears that the dependence of the single 
client may induce the auditor to acquiesce to the firm’s demands for fear of losing their only 
client.  The coefficient on AvgTenure is not significant, it appears average auditor tenure does 
not significantly influence the probability of receiving a positive opinion from the PCAOB 
inspection process.  Lastly, our proxy for expertise is not significant either.  It appears having 
more audit partners does not contribute to the probability of receiving a positive opinion.  As 
a sensitivity check, we employ alternative measures of expertise, the ratio of audit partners to 
office locations and the ratio of audit partners to overall clients, and find no significant 
relationship.  Overall, we find auditors that receive a positive opinion from the PCAOB 
review process are larger (in terms of staff members) and exhibit greater auditor independence 
(in terms of having more than one client).   
 Defining a positive opinion as receiving no failure to identify a GAAP deficiency, the 
size variable is not significant or in the predicted direction.  Only the coefficients on 
OneClient and Partner/Prof are significant.  Like the regression in the first column, having a 
single client increases the probability that the auditor will fail to identify a departure from 
GAAP.  Surprisingly, the greater the ratio of partners to professional staff the less likely the 
auditor is to receive a positive opinion (in the failure to identify a GAAP departure sense).  
Overall, in the regression defining a positive opinion as the firm receives no indication that 
 29
they failed to identify a departure from GAAP, only OneClient has significant explanatory 
power in the predicted direction.   
8. Conclusion 
In 2002, the U.S. Congress concluded that peer review for public company auditors 
was ineffective at providing a “fair and independent” audit report and created the private 
sector non-profit PCAOB to conduct inspections at accounting firms.  Understanding the 
implications of the external review system, in the accounting industry, is important to assess 
whether the costs of implementation and maintenance of this new system is justified.  Given 
the finding that peer review opinions are useful with respect to decisions about dismissal and 
hiring of auditors (Hilary and Lennox, 2005), the question remains: What are the benefits 
replacing a self-regulatory system with a private regulatory agency?   
We focus on the association between the report opinion (from both the PCAOB 
inspection process and the AICPA peer review) and earnings quality firms employing 
reviewed auditors.  Our analysis provides evidence that one benefit of switching from peer 
reviews to independent inspections is that audit reports from the PCAOB are able to 
distinguish accounting discretion in the auditees, whereas the peer review report is not.  
Further, the PCAOB opinion is associated with higher earnings informativeness compared to 
the peer review opinion, even after controlling for audit complexity.  Given that the PCAOB 
inspection report opinions are associated with earnings quality, we next identify 
characteristics associated with auditors that receive a positive opinion.  We find they are 
larger (measured by the number of professional staff) and are more independent of clients. 
Our research contributes to the debate on the merits of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
specifically the provision creating a private sector non-profit organization to oversee and 
inspect auditors.  Our research provides evidence that the PCAOB opinion is associated with 
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earnings quality whereas the AICPA peer review opinion is not.  However, the implication for 
standard setting is inconclusive because we do not examine directly the cost-benefit tradeoff.  
In addition, we provide evidence on the effectiveness of the peer review report at 
distinguishing earnings quality at firms audited by the reviewed auditors. Auditors with only 
private clients and auditors in other countries continue to rely on self-regulation, therefore 
understanding the implications of the self-regulation opinion on earnings quality provides 
information useful to regulators and users of those particular financial statements.   
We contribute to the literature by shedding light on quality differentiation among non-
Big 4 auditors.  Overall, the accounting literature supports the notion that Big 4 accounting 
firms are of higher quality.  However, 10% of publicly traded companies are audited by non-
Big 4 auditors and we do not know much about their audit quality.  To the best of our 
knowledge, no prior study has examined the differences in audit quality within non-Big 4 
auditors.  Even though non-Big 4 accounting firms audit only 10% of publicly listed 
companies in the US, quality distinctions among them are important.  First, non-Big 4 
auditors tend to audit small companies for which there is not much information about the firm 
(analyst forecasts, management forecasts) therefore understanding the quality of the auditor is 
of particular importance.  Second, the accounting literature suggests that audit failures are 
more prevalent in small offices and small audit firms16 and the evidence indicates that audit 
failure is costly to shareholders.17  Therefore, understanding the audit quality distinctions 
                                                 
16Caplan and Raedy (2006) find support for the hypothesis that large offices have a lower incidence of 
accounting  restatement relative to small offices, among the Big 6.  Similarly, Beasley et al. (1997) report that 
firms experiencing AAER action during 1987 to1997 are relatively small (total assets and sales less than $100 
million), and 78% are not traded on the NYSE or ASE.   
17Beneish (1997) shows that GAAP violators (charged by SEC or admitted) earn significant negative abnormal 
returns for two years following the violation.   
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between small auditors is important to investors.  We show size (as measured by the number 
of staff) matters even within the non-Big 4 size partition.    
Our findings show that the PCAOB opinion is associated with earnings quality and we 
believe future research on this topic could further examine the incremental informativeness of 
the PCAOB inspection opinion, i.e. whether the PCAOB opinion is incrementally associated 
with earnings quality after controlling for other public information financial statement users 
possess. Two tests are appropriate for investigating the incremental informativeness. First, 
examining the market reaction to the PCAOB report will shed light on whether the 
information contained in the report was known to the market beforehand (assuming market 
efficiency). Second, researchers could examine the association between the PCAOB report 
opinion and past events such as restatements, litigation alleging accounting improprieties, 
firing the auditor and qualified audit opinions.  If the report is incrementally informative, we 
would expect an association between the PCAOB opinion and earnings quality after 
controlling for such past events.   
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 Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics by Regulatory System
PCAOB sample:
No. of 
Auditors 
with 
Data
No. of 
Auditor-
Client 
Obs.
Mean Median Std.dev. 1st quartile 
3rd 
quartile Min Max
Avg. no. of professional staff members per auditor 178 507 14 3,022 3 34 1 23,840
No. of clients per audit firm with Compustat data 178 5,795   33 2 174 1 3 1 1,380
Avg. total assets of clients (Millions) 169 5,662   5,450 334 44,716 68 1,411 0 1,484,101
Avg. market cap. of clients (Millions) 169 5,383   2,933 299 14,285 68 1,226 0 386,402
Peer Review sample:
Avg. no. of professional staff members per auditor* 324 104 37 281 15 79 1 3,062
No. of clients per audit firm with Compustat data 328 5,685   17 1 122 1 3 1 1,241
Avg. total assets of clients (Millions) 322 5,580   4,024 204 32,811 37 888 0 1,097,190
Avg. market cap. of clients (Millions) 317 5,380   1,976 97 12,331 20 543 0 301,238
* This variable does not include the Big 4 because the data on professional staff members per auditor is not available in the peer review reports.  We do not use this variable in the subsequent regressions.
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Table 1 (cont.)
Panel B: Number of Clients by Industry and by Regulatory system
PCAOB Sample Peer Review Sample
Banking 558 778
Business Services 738 772
Pharmaceutical Products 370 309
Electronic Equipment 331 307
Computers 220 237
Trading 359 308
Petroleum and Natural Gas 177 158
Wholesale 187 177
Medical Equipment 191 171
Miscellaneous 68 74
Telecommunications 190 167
Restauraunts, Hotel, Motel 107 117
Retail 270 218
Machinery 159 145
Measuring and Control Equip. 118 111
Entertainment 83 89
Electrical Equipment 83 69
Healthcare 88 79
Other 1,498 1,399
Total 5,795 5,685
Firms are assigned to 48 industries based on the classification system developed by Fama and French (1997).
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of the Earnings Quality Measures by Regulatory System
PCAOB sample:
No. of 
Auditor-
Client Obs.
No. of 
Auditors 
with Data
Mean Median Std.dev. 1st quartile 
3rd 
quartile Min Max
Discretionary Accruals Models:
EQ1 3,751 129 -0.01 -0.01 0.11 -0.05 0.03 -0.41 0.43
EQ2 3,751 129 0.01 0.00 0.10 -0.03 0.04 -0.39 0.45
EQ3 3,751 129 -0.01 -0.01 0.11 -0.05 0.03 -0.42 0.42
Propensity to meet benchmarks:
FREQ_Zero 4,504 149 0.12 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00
FREQ_ZeroChng 4,644 151 0.30 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00
Smoothing variables:
SmoothA5 4,382 140 1.58 0.98 3.37 0.54 1.76 0.00 109.92
SmoothQ8 4,047 136 1.90 1.45 2.33 0.81 2.28 0.00 59.53
Peer Review sample:
Discretionary Accruals Models:
EQ1 3,601         222 -0.02 -0.01 0.13 -0.07 0.04 -0.44 0.42
EQ2 3,601         222 -0.01 -0.01 0.12 -0.05 0.03 -0.41 0.42
EQ3 3,601         222 -0.01 -0.01 0.12 -0.07 0.04 -0.41 0.42
Propensity to meet benchmarks:
FREQ_Zero 4,305         254 0.14 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00
FREQ_ZeroChng 4,404         254 0.23 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00
Smoothing variables:
SmoothA5 3,978         228 1.65 0.99 2.61 0.54 1.84 0.00 53.07
SmoothQ8 3,728         227 1.89 1.30 2.50 0.67 2.28 0.00 48.92
Notes: EQ1 is the value of abnormal accruals (scaled by lagged total assets) computed using the modified Jones (1991) model (see equation 3).    EQ2 is the value of abnormal current accruals used in Teoh et al. (1998) (see 
equation 4).  EQ3 is the value of abnormal accruals (scaled by lagged total assets) computed using the modified Jones (1991) model after controlling for performance (Kothari et al., 2005).  The "normal (current) accruals" 
models are estimated for every industry-year.  Compustat data item numbers and estimation details are described in Section 4.2.1.  FREQ_Zero is the frequency of times the frim reports a small quarterly earnings profit over 
the year.  We categorize a firm as having a small earnings profit (FREQ_Zero) when quarterly earnings (Compustat #23 - #32) scaled by total assets (Compustat #44) at the end of quarter q-1 falls with in the range of (0.00 
to 0.0025).  FREQ_ZeroChng is the frequency of times the firm reports a zero change in quarterly earnings over the year.  We categorize a firm as having a small positive change in earnings (FREQ_ZeroChng) when the 
quarterly earnings surprise (Eq – Eq-4) scaled by total assets at the end of quarter q-5 falls with in the range of (0.00 to 0.0025).  Earnings is measured as earnings after tax and special items. 
 SmoothA5 is an annual smoothing variable measured as the standard deviation of annual cash flows adjusted for extraordinary items (Compustat #308 – Compustat #124) divided by the standard deviation of earnings 
(Compustat #123) over the current and past 4 annual periods.  SmoothQ8 is a quarterly smoothing variable measured as the standard deviation of quarterly cash flows adjusted for extraordinary items (Compustat #108 – 
Compustat #78) divided by the standard deviation of earnings (Compustat #76) over the current and past 7 quarters.  Smoothing reduces the variability of reported earnings by altering the accounting component of earnings 
and high values of this measure indicate that, ceteris paribus, insiders exercise accounting discretion to smooth reported earnings. 
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Table 3
Inspection Report Opinions by Regulatory System
Non-Big 4 Big 4
Panel A: PCAOB sample # auditors
 Avg. # 
deficiencies/ 
weaknesses  # auditors 
Number of Audit Firms with
        No audit deficiencies 64             0 0
        1 or more audit deficiencies 110           3.5               4               
174           2.20             4               
Number of Audit Firms with
        No failure to idenify a GAAP Deficiency 144           1.29             2               
        A failure to idenify a GAAP Deficiency 30             6.53             2               
174           2.20             4               
Panel B: Peer review sample
Number of Audit Firms with
        Clean opinion 137           0 0
        Unmodified opinion 178           1.9               4               
        Modified opinion 8               2.4               0
        Adverse opinion 1               6.0               0
324           1.14             4               
Notes: A GAAP deficiency refers to an inspection report that reveals that "the Firm's failure to identify, or to 
address appropriately, a departure from GAAP that related to a potentially material failure to disclose 
appropriately in the audited financial statements."
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Table 4
Mean/Median Accounting Discretion of Average Clients by PCAOB Opinion
Full Sample (Big 4 and Non Big-4) and One Observation per Auditor
No Audit Deficiency  
1 or more Audit 
Deficiencies
p-value for 
difference
Mean Median No. obs Mean Median No. obs Mean Median
Panel A: More than one audit deficiency
Discretionary Accruals Measures: -0.0085 -0.0068 48 -0.020 -0.021 81 0.78 0.93
EQ1 -0.0039 -0.0024 48 -0.016 -0.019 81 0.77 0.90
EQ2 -0.012 -0.011 48 -0.019 -0.020 81 0.85 0.91
EQ3
Propensity to meet benchmarks:
Benchmark: zero operating earnings 0.074 0.058 55 0.116 0.074 96 0.33 0.00
Benchmark: zero change in operating earnings 0.042 0.036 55 0.112 0.063 96 0.06 0.00
Earnings Smoothing Variables:
Std.Dev(quarterly cash flows) / Std.Dev(quarterly net income) 1.232 1.264 50 1.452 1.217 86 0.25 0.48
Std.Dev(annual cash flows) / Std.Dev(annual net income) 1.135 1.128 49 1.365 1.199 91 0.37 1.00
Auditor did not  fail to 
identify a departure from 
GAAP
Auditor failed to identify a 
departure from GAAP 
p-value for 
difference
Mean Median No. obs Mean Median No. obs Mean Median
Panel B: Failure to identify a departure from GAAP
Discretionary Accruals Measures:
EQ1 -0.032 -0.031 101 0.043 0.039 28 0.10     0.24     
EQ2 -0.028 -0.027 101 0.048 0.038 28 0.10     0.12     
EQ3 -0.029 -0.027 101 0.031 0.023 28 0.15     0.42     
Propensity to meet benchmarks:
Benchmark: zero operating earnings 0.083 0.071 120 0.173 0.033 31 0.08     <.0001
Benchmark: zero change in operating earnings 0.085 0.063 120 0.093 0.016 31 0.87     0.22     
Earnings Smoothing Variables:
Std.Dev(quarterly cash flows) / Std.Dev(quarterly net income) 1.295 1.237 109 1.680 1.287 27 0.09     0.29     
Std.Dev(annual cash flows) / Std.Dev(annual net income) 1.200 1.146 111 1.607 1.280 29 0.17     0.08     
Notes: See Table 2 for variable description and Compustat data items.  The p-value for the statistical significance of differences between the mean values is calculated 
using the paired t-test (Hogg & Tanis, 2001).  The p-value for the statistical significance of differences between the median values is calculated using the non-parametric 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test, that is not sensitive to outliers.
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Table 5
Mean/Median Accounting Discretion of Average Clients by Peer Review Opinion
Full Sample (Big 4 and Non Big-4) and One Observation per Auditor
Clean Opinion Non-Clean Opinion
p-value for 
difference
Mean Median No. obs Mean Median No. obs Mean Median
Panel A: Clean vs. Non-Clean Opinion
Discretionary Accruals Measures:
EQ1 -0.002 -0.001 88 -0.028 -0.030 134 0.29 0.14
EQ2 -0.002 -0.004 88 -0.018 -0.019 134 0.52 0.27
EQ3 0.005 0.003 88 -0.008 -0.010 134 0.61 0.17
Propensity to meet benchmarks:
Benchmark: zero operating earnings 0.108 0.083 103 0.121 0.096 151 0.77 0.99
Benchmark: zero change in operating earnings 0.112 0.096 103 0.168 0.139 151 0.21 0.28
Earnings Smoothing Variables:
Std.Dev(quarterly cash flows) / Std.Dev(quarterly net income) 1.436 1.367 93 1.541 1.419 134 0.58 0.98
Std.Dev(annual cash flows) / Std.Dev(annual net income) 1.476 1.413 94 1.272 1.145 134 0.29 0.69
Clean or unmodified opinion Adverse or modified opinion
p-value for 
difference
Mean Median No. obs Mean Median No. obs Mean Median
Panel B: Clean and Unmodified vs. Adverse and Modified Opinion
Discretionary Accruals Measures:
EQ1 -0.018 -0.019 216 -0.012 -0.006 6 0.94     1.00     
EQ2 -0.012 -0.013 216 -0.003 -0.003 6 0.90     0.96     
EQ3 -0.002 -0.005 216 -0.005 -0.002 6 0.97     0.76     
Propensity to meet benchmarks:
Benchmark: zero operating earnings 0.119 0.093 248 0.009 0.000 7 0.41     0.55     
Benchmark: zero change in operating earnings 0.145 0.121 248 0.156 0.143 7 0.94     0.80     
Earnings Smoothing Variables:
Std.Dev(quarterly cash flows) / Std.Dev(quarterly net income) 1.494 1.399 220 1.617 1.349 7 0.82     0.93     
Std.Dev(annual cash flows) / Std.Dev(annual net income) 1.354 1.256 221 1.416 1.250 7 0.91     0.70     
Notes: See Table 2 for variable description and Compustat data items.  The p-value for the statistical significance of differences between the mean values is calculated 
using the paired t-test (Hogg & Tanis, 2001).  The p-value for the statistical significance of differences between the median values is calculated using the non-parametric 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test, that is not sensitive to outliers.
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Table 6
 Accounting Discretion by PCAOB Opinion
Robustness: Non-Big 4 Sample 
No Audit Deficiency  
1 or more Audit 
Deficiencies
p-value for 
difference
Mean Median No. obs Mean Median No. obs Mean Median
Panel A: More than one audit deficiency
Discretionary Accruals Measures:
EQ1 -0.010 -0.010 65 0.009 -0.005 662 0.45 0.76
EQ2 0.000 0.011 65 0.021 0.006 662 0.36 0.88
EQ3 -0.011 -0.007 65 0.008 -0.007 662 0.43 0.87
Propensity to meet benchmarks:
Benchmark: zero operating earnings 0.056 0.000 91 0.132 0.000 819 0.10 0.07
Benchmark: zero change in operating earnings 0.055 0.000 91 0.184 0.000 819 0.01 0.01
Earnings Smoothing Variables:
Std.Dev(quarterly cash flows) / Std.Dev(quarterly net income) 1.155 0.868 73 1.443 0.966 700 0.10 0.15
Std.Dev(annual cash flows) / Std.Dev(annual net income) 1.031 0.807 76 1.199 0.783 776 0.29 0.85
Auditor did not  fail to 
identify a departure from 
GAAP
Auditor failed to identify a 
departure from GAAP 
p-value for 
difference
Mean Median No. obs Mean Median No. obs Mean Median
Panel B: Failure to identify a departure from GAAP
Discretionary Accruals Measures:
EQ1 -0.010 -0.002 206 0.014 -0.006 521 0.13     0.87     
EQ2 -0.001 0.007 206 0.027 0.006 521 0.06     0.63     
EQ3 -0.013 0.002 206 0.014 -0.008 521 0.08     0.87     
Propensity to meet benchmarks:
Benchmark: zero operating earnings 0.082 0.000 298 0.145 0.000 612 0.04     0.03     
Benchmark: zero change in operating earnings 0.084 0.000 298 0.214 0.000 612 <.0001  <.0001
Earnings Smoothing Variables:
Std.Dev(quarterly cash flows) / Std.Dev(quarterly net income) 1.154 0.793 268 1.534 1.023 584 0.00     <.0001
Std.Dev(annual cash flows) / Std.Dev(annual net income) 1.037 0.697 268 1.252 0.844 584 0.03     0.00     
Notes: See Table 2 for variable description and Compustat data items.  The p-value for the statistical significance of differences between the mean values is calculated 
using the paired t-test (Hogg & Tanis, 2001).  The p-value for the statistical significance of differences between the median values is calculated using the non-parametric 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test, that is not sensitive to outliers.
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Table 7
Accounting Discretion by Peer Review Opinion
Robustness: Non-Big 4 Sample
Clean Opinion Non-Clean Opinion
p-value for 
difference
Mean Median No. obs Mean Median No. obs Mean Median
Panel A: Clean vs. Non-Clean Opinion
Discretionary Accruals Measures:
EQ1 -0.011 -0.002 205 -0.025 -0.025 517 0.38 0.16
EQ2 -0.011 -0.007 205 -0.015 -0.0154 517 0.80 0.48
EQ3 -0.002 -0.006 205 -0.0135 -0.0149 517 0.43 0.25
Propensity to meet benchmarks:
Benchmark: zero operating earnings 0.103 0.000 266 0.112 0.000 622 0.76 0.95
Benchmark: zero change in operating earnings 0.098 0.000 266 0.158 0.000 622 0.05 0.09
Earnings Smoothing Variables:
Std.Dev(quarterly cash flows) / Std.Dev(quarterly net income) 1.411 0.902 207 1.452 0.922 509 0.73 0.69
Std.Dev(annual cash flows) / Std.Dev(annual net income) 1.369 0.848 218 1.378 0.832 515 0.95 0.48
Clean or unmodified opinion Adverse or modified opinion
p-value for 
difference
Mean Median No. obs Mean Median No. obs Mean Median
Panel B: Clean and Unmodified vs. Adverse and Modified Opinion
Discretionary Accruals Measures:
EQ1 -0.020 -0.016 685 -0.032 0.003 37 0.72     0.95     
EQ2 -0.013 -0.012 685 -0.027 -0.019 37 0.66     0.71     
EQ3 -0.010 -0.013 685 -0.015 0.008 37 0.87     0.75     
Propensity to meet benchmarks:
Benchmark: zero operating earnings 0.113 0.000 843 0.047 0.000 45 0.30     0.33     
Benchmark: zero change in operating earnings 0.142 0.000 843 0.089 0.000 45 0.40     0.29     
Earnings Smoothing Variables:
Std.Dev(quarterly cash flows) / Std.Dev(quarterly net income) 1.416 0.913 682 1.925 0.973 34 0.04     0.52     
Std.Dev(annual cash flows) / Std.Dev(annual net income) 1.354 0.836 695 1.754 0.765 38 0.16     0.98     
Notes: See Table 2 for variable description and Compustat data items.  The p-value for the statistical significance of differences between the mean values is calculated 
using the paired t-test (Hogg & Tanis, 2001).  The p-value for the statistical significance of differences between the median values is calculated using the non-parametric 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test, that is not sensitive to outliers.
 
 Table 8
The Ability of Earnings to Predict Future Cash Flow
PCAOB Sample
Non-Big 4 Sample Non-Big4 and Big 4 Sample 
negative opinion is 
defined as 1 or more 
audit deficiencies 
negative opinion is 
defined as auditor 
failed to identify a 
departure from GAAP
negative opinion is 
defined as 1 or more 
audit deficiencies 
negative opinion is 
defined as auditor 
failed to identify a 
departure from GAAP
Intercept -0.913 -0.537 0.072 0.008
(-1.15) (-2.07) (2.24)** (2.32)**
NEGATIVE 0.445 0.042 0.072 0.007
(0.56) (0.16) (-2.00)** (0.49)
EARN 0.190 0.168 0.006 0.006
(19.50)*** (23.04)*** (70.59)*** (74.67)***
NEGATIVE*EARN -0.009 -0.058 0.000 -0.002
(-3.41)*** (-2.81)*** (-1.55) (-10.70)***
#Segments 0.055 0.061 0.001 0.001
(1.15) (1.25) (3.10)*** (2.98)***
Foreign_Income 0.167 0.165 0.008 0.008
(0.61) (0.60) (2.94)*** (2.85)***
M&A 0.192 0.143 0.009 0.009
(0.69) (0.52) (3.52)*** (3.56)***
Restructuring 0.148 0.153 0.009 0.008
(0.50) (0.52) (0.45) (0.42)
No. of Observations 648 648 4,259 4,259
No. of Auditors 50 50 54 54
Adj. R2 0.49 0.48 0.58 0.59
***/**/* represent statistical significance at 10%/5%/1% levels two-tailed.  T-statistics in parentheses.
CFO  =
NEGATIVE  =
EARN  =
#Segments  =
Foreign_Income  =
M&A  =
Restructuring  =
The dependent variable is CFO 
an indicator variable that is set equal to one if a firm reports foreign income in 2003, and zero otherwise (Compustat Segment File)
an indicator variable that is set equal to one if a firm is involved in a merger or acquisition, and zero otherwise (AFTNT#1)
an indicator variable that is set equal to one of a firm was involved in a restructuring in year t, and zero otherwise (Data376-Data379)
cash flow from operating activities (Data308) deflated by total assets (Data6)
an indicator variable that is set equal to one if the firm's auditor receives a negative opinion from the review process
earnings (Data172) deflated by total assets (Data6)
number of reported business segments in year t (Compustat Segment File)
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Table 9
The Ability of Earnings to Predict Future Cash Flow
Peer Review Sample
Non-Big 4 Sample Non-Big4 and Big 4 Sample 
negative opinion is 
defined as unmodified, 
modified or adverse
negative opinion is 
defined as unmodified 
or adverse
negative opinion is 
defined as unmodified, 
modified or adverse
negative opinion is 
defined as unmodified 
or adverse
Intercept 0.026 0.040 0.014 0.027
(-21.19)*** (-15.37)*** (-18.43)*** (-9.27)***
NEGATIVE 0.031 0.066 0.022 0.022
(-3.29)** (-4.20)** (1.24) (-3.85)**
EARN 0.022 0.020 0.030 0.032
(9.30)*** (10.66)*** (10.72)*** (10.01)***
NEGATIVE*EARN 0.001 0.007 0.000 0.020
(3.54)*** (44.96)*** (-0.54) (9.93)***
#Segments 0.016 0.016 0.003 0.003
(6.16)*** (6.19)*** (3.01)* (3.16)*
Foreign_Income 0.061 0.064 0.006 0.006
(1.66) (1.40) (2.59)* (2.37)*
M&A 0.032 0.048 0.016 0.017
(4.98)** (3.83)** (1.18) (1.18)
Restructuring 0.036 0.055 0.022 0.019
(4.74)** (3.03)* (2.09) (2.30)*
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Observations 749 749 3,885 3,885
No. of Auditors 229 229 233 233
Adj. R2 0.52 0.51 0.53 0.53
***/**/* represent statistical significance at 10%/5%/1% levels two-tailed.  T-statistics in parentheses.
CFO  =
NEGATIVE  =
EARN  =
#Segments  =
Foreign_Income  =
M&A  =
Restructuring  =
The dependent variable is CFO 
an indicator variable that is set equal to one if a firm reports foreign income in 2003, and zero otherwise (Compustat Segment File)
an indicator variable that is set equal to one if a firm is involved in a merger or acquisition, and zero otherwise (AFTNT#1)
an indicator variable that is set equal to one of a firm was involved in a restructuring in year t, and zero otherwise (Data376-Data379)
cash flow from operating activities (Data308) deflated by total assets (Data6)
an indicator variable that is set equal to one if the firm's auditor receives a negative opinion from the review process
earnings (Data172) deflated by total assets (Data6)
number of reported business segments in year t (Compustat Segment File)
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Table 10
Logit Regression of PCAOB Opinion on Characteristics of the Auditor
 
Predicted Sign positive = no audit deficiencies postive = auditor did not fail to identify a departure from GAAP
Intercept -0.235 2.645
(0.790) (0.008)***
logNumStaff + 0.322 -0.123
(0.080)* (0.505)
logNumClient – -1.109 -0.627
(0.000)*** (0.010)***
OneClient – -1.339 -0.607
(0.023)** (0.468)
AvgTenure –/+ 0.977 1.757
(0.211) (0.146)
Partner/Prof + -0.641 -1.870
(0.503) (0.025)**
Big4 – -10.100 1.926
(0.987) (0.253)
Positive opinion 64 146
Negative opinion 114 32
Model Chi-sqaured 39.48 29.22
% concordant pairs (+tied) 75.4 76.9
***/**/* represent statistical significance at 10%/5%/1% levels two-tailed. p-values in parentheses.
POSITIVE
logNumStaff
OneClient
AvgTenure
logNumClient
Partner/Prof
Big4 = an indicator variable equal to one if the auditor is a Big 4 auditor (Deloitte and Touche, Ernst and Young, KPMG or 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers) and zero otherwise
= ratio of the number of audit partners divided by the number of professional staff employed by the auditor in year t scaled 
to be a variable between 0 and 1
= an indicator variable equal to one if the auditor receives a positive audit report from the PCAOB inspection process and 
= the natural logarithm of the total number of partners and professional staff employed by the auditor in year t
= the natural logarithm of the total number of clients serviced by the auditor in year t
= an idicator variable equal to one if the auditor only has one client in year t and zero otherwise
= the average tenure of an auditor's portfolio of clients scaled to be avariable between 0 and 1
POSITIVEt =  γ0 + γ1logNumStafft + γ2OneClientt + γ3AvgTenuret  + γ4logNumClientt   
    + γ5Part/Proft + γ6Big4t + εt 
 
